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TOWARDS A COMPETITIVE LEARNING MODEL OF
MIRROR EFFECTS IN YES/NO RECOGNITION MEMORY
TESTS
K. C. DIETZ∗, H. BOWMAN and J. C. VAN HOOFF




Manipulations of encoding strength and stimulus class can lead to a simulta-
neous increase in hits and decrease in false alarms for a given condition in a
yes/no recognition memory test. Based on signal detection theory, the strength-
based ‘mirror effect’ is thought to involve a shift in response criterion/threshold
(Type I), whereas the stimulus class effect derives from a specific ordering of the
memory strength signals for presented items (Type II). We implemented both
suggested mechanisms in a simple, competitive feed-forward neural network
model with a learning rule related to Bayesian inference. In a single-process
approach to recognition, the underlying decision axis as well as the response
criteria/thresholds were derived from network activation. Initial results repli-
cated findings in the literature and are a first step towards a more neurally
explicit model of mirror effects in recognition memory tests.
1. Introduction
The accommodation of mirror effects in recognition tests has long posed
a puzzle for memory researchers and has caused them to revise their as-
sumptions of the underlying decision process (for a review, see Ref. 1). In
a typical verbal yes/no recognition test, a list of individual words is pre-
sented during a study phase. In a subsequent test phase, the studied old
words are randomly interleaved with new, not previously presented, words.
For each test item, participants have to give a response, indicating whether
they think it is old (‘yes’ response) or new (‘no’ response). The resulting
decision matrix contains four possible outcomes: hits (‘yes’ responses to old
items), misses (‘no’ responses to old items), false alarms (‘yes’ responses to
new items) and correct rejections (‘no’ responses to new items).
A mirror effect occurs when there are two conditions that differ in their
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ease of recognition, and the easier condition shows not only a higher hit
rate than the harder condition, but (perhaps surprisingly) also a lower false
alarm rate.2 While the generality of this effect has been questioned (e.g.
Ref. 3), it is generally accepted as a ‘regularity of recognition memory’ (e.g.
Ref. 4, p.177).
We introduce theories that explain which mechanisms may give rise to
mirror effects, and describe a preliminary neural network model implement-
ing these in a biologically plausible way.
2. Signal detection theory and the mirror effect
Conventionally, recognition decisions are analyzed from a signal detection
perspective (for a detailed introduction, see Ref. 5). Two underlying fac-
tors are assumed: the strength of the memory signal elicited by a test
itema, and its relation to the placement of the participant’s response crite-
rion/threshold.
Memory signals for old and new items are represented as two Gaussian
distributions of unequal variance.6 The variance of the old distribution ex-
ceeds that of the new distribution, as it reflects the variability of learning in
the study phase in addition to noise.7 The distance between the means of
the old and new distributions (in units of standard deviation) determines
the ease of discrimination and is termed d′.
The criterion/threshold can be thought of as a single point along the
strength-of-evidence axis. Test items whose memory signal exceeds this cri-
terion/threshold value receive a ‘yes’ response, resulting in hits for old items
and false alarms for new items. An optimal decision criterion/threshold
maximizes correct responses and would be placed at the point of intersec-
tion of the old and new distributions.
Based on this signal detection framework, it is thought that two mech-
anisms can give rise to a mirror effect: shifts in the absolute placement of
the response criterion/threshold along the strength-of-evidence axis (Type
I) and changes in the underlying distributions (Type II).8
2.1. Type I mirror effects
Type I mirror effects (see Fig. 1) are usually observed for strength manip-
ulations of otherwise identical stimulus materials.9 For example, repeating
aWhether the signal is based on a single continuous variable, combines a continuous with
a dichotomous variable or involves a second independent process, is beyond the scope of
this paper.
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half of the items in the study phase will lead to more hits and fewer false
alarms compared to items presented only once.
Repetition has long been shown to lead to more accurate and robust
encoding (e.g. Ref. 10), so that the mean of the strong old condition (repeat
presentation) tends to be located further along the decision axis (further to
the right) than that of the weak old condition (single presentation). This is
also reflected by a larger d′ value in the strong condition.
Assuming the mean signal of the new distribution remains constant,
participants have to shift their decision criterion/threshold upwards (to the
right) to maintain an optimal response strategy. This criterion/threshold
shift accounts for fewer false alarms in the strong condition, while the simul-
taneous upwards (to the right) movement of the old distribution explains
the increased hit rate. Note that there is only a single new distribution in
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Fig. 1. Type I mirror effect: Underlying distributions and response criteria/thresholds.
2.2. Type II mirror effects
Type II mirror effects (see Fig. 1) are usually observed for manipulations of
stimulus class, for example where high- and low frequency words are pre-
sented during both study and test. In this case, no criterion/threshold shift
is observed even if explicit cues are provided about which items are of high-
and low frequency;8 yet the low frequency words consistently produce lower
false alarm- and higher hit-rates. Given that low frequency words tend to
have fewer definitions and are used in less varied contexts, they are thought
to elicit a lower strength memory signal than high frequency items when
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new. By the same token, they are also more accurately encoded, explaining
the advantage for recognition of low frequency old items.11,12 It has also
been proposed that due to their comparative ‘novelty’, low frequency words
elicit increased attention and therefore more elaborative processing.2,13 As
a result of the increased separation of the old and new distribution for

















Fig. 2. Type II mirror effect: Underlying distributions and response criterion/threshold.
LF = low frequency words, HF = high frequency words.
3. Our model
Although there are a large variety of single- and dual-process models of
recognition (e.g. Ref. 14,15, for a review, see Ref. 7), not all address mir-
ror effects. Those that do are often single-process Bayesian models9,12,16,17
(but see e.g. Ref. 18 for an exception). While theoretically pleasing, such
Bayesian models largely ignore issues of neural implementation by using
mathematical quantities without specifying how these might be calculated
by the brain. In this paper, we present a first step towards a neurally more
detailed model of the mirror effect in yes/no recognition memory tests.
We use McClelland and Chappell’s subjective likelihood model16 as a
starting point, as it reproduces a wide variety of recognition memory phe-
nomena. As in their model, each simulation run emulates a yes/no recog-
nition test in which a participant is presented, one ‘word’ at a time, with a
single, multi-item study list. Study items are learned, that is encoded into
memory. In a subsequent test phase, (studied) old items are mixed with
new, not previously presented, items. No learning occurs at test, but stored
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information about each presented item is retrieved and a yes/no decision is
made according to its position relative to the response criterion/threshold.
We preserved a number of the implementation ideas but deviate from
their key idea that the recognition decisions are based on a likelihood eval-
uation: in our model, the decision axis represents simple memory trace
strength often termed ‘familiarity’.
The model is a simple two-layer feed-forward network with a competitive
Conditional Principal Component Analysis learning rule (CPCA, Ref. 19)
using Winner-Takes-All (WTA). We use distributed representation of items
on the input layer, but a localist representation on the output layer. Each
item is a binary vector of ‘features’ (such as orthographic properties or
semantic and contextual associations) across the 500 units of the input
layer. Fifty randomly chosen features are active (1), all others are inactive
(0), with the exception of low frequency items, which have one fewer active
features. This reflects the previously mentioned property that low frequency
items have fewer definitions and appear in fewer contexts. Each stimulus
class comprises 30 such patterns. Initially, the output layer consists of 120
detectors. These are reduced to a maximum number of 60 (for 2 classes of
30 items) after learning, so that invariably, one detector comes to encode
one item presented during the study phase (old items). The exact number is
subject to constraints of the learning algorithm, which allows the possibility
that a single detector comes to encode multiple items, but the initial weight
settings keep the probability of this low.
In the study phase, items are presented in random order. In the simu-
lation of a Type I mirror effect (strength-based), half of the items at study
are presented twice whilst all other parameters are kept constant. In the
simulation of a Type II mirror effect (frequency-based), half the presented
patterns are of low frequency, with one less active input unit and a higher
learning rate. The latter reflects the previously discussed increased atten-
tion to low frequency items. Weights between the input and output layer
are initialized to random values in the range [0.45–0.55], which is the ini-
tial conditional probability that a given input unit is active for a specific
detected item. When an input pattern is presented, competitive winner-
takes-all learning takes place. The activation of each detector (denoted yj)
is calculated by feeding its summed, weighted and normalized net input
(denoted ηj , Eq. 1) through a sigmoid function with a gain term λ = 10
and bias term β = 0.5 (Eq. 2), where N is the number of active units in an
input pattern.












Weights of the most active detector are adjusted using a CPCA Hebbian
learning rule (Eq. 3, Ref. 19), bounded between [0–1]. Weights between
active input units and detectors are increased and connections between
active detectors and inactive input units are decreased. The rate of change
is determined by the learning constant ǫ. (No change occurs for weights
to inactive detectors, unlike for some other biologically plausible Hebbian
learning rules.b)
∆wij = ǫ yj(xi − wij) (3)
For each trial (that is, for each presented item in the study phase), the noisy
activation of the winning detector is added to a weighted average (denoted
avgmax). Relative proportions are determined by the time constant τ , which
was set to 0.7, so that the current trial contributes 0.3 and the previous
average 0.7.
avgmax(t) = τ avgmax (t− 1) + (1− τ) yj (4)
In Equation 4, yj denotes the activation of the winning detector and t
indexes trials, i.e. patterns being presented to the network. This ‘time av-
eraging’ is a simple and efficient method used by biological neurons for in-
creasing the signal-to-noise ratio.20 Initially, all time averages have a value
of 0.5 to indicate that no information is known about the relationship be-
tween the detector activation and the input feature activation. In the Type
I mirror effect simulations, time averages for weak old and strong old items
are calculated throughout the study phase. These are based on the noisy
activation value of the most active detector for a given pattern. In the Type
II mirror effect simulation, a single time average for old items is calculated
by collapsing across high and low frequency words.
On completion of the study phase, but before the test phase, thirty
random new patterns are generated per condition (Type I simulation: new,
Type II simulation: weak class new, strong class new). These are presented
bWe would like to thank Max Garagnani for pointing this out.
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Table 1. Model generated data for Type I and Type II mirror effects over 100 simu-
lations. Hits and false alarms (FA) are shown in percentages. d′ values reflect the ease
of discrimination. Criteria/thresholds are based on estimated activation averages.
Weak cond. Strong cond. High freq. Low freq.
Hit 75.100 91.767 80.767 96.400
FA 7.000 2.900 16.400 1.1
d
′ 2.153 3.285 1.847 4.089
Criterion/Threshold .541 .558 0.550
to the network using the fixed learned weights from the study phase. Time
averages are calculated based on network activation as before (see Eq. 4).
For the Type II simulation, the time average is collapsed across high and
low frequency words to generate a single time average for new items.
In the test phase, previously presented items are mixed with an equal
number of new items and presented in random order. Activation values
are calculated as before. For simplicity, we assume an unbiased response
criterion/threshold in each simulation, located half-way between the es-
timated average activation of the maximally active detector for old and
new items (i.e. avgmax), both derived prior to the test phase (see Eq. 4).
The criterion/threshold is based on estimates rather than actual values, as
participants are assumed not to have access to this information.21
In the Type I mirror effect simulation (strength-based), two crite-
ria/thresholds are used: one between new and weak old items (single pre-
sentation) and one between new and strong old items (repeat presentation).
This represents the notion that on average, participants have a higher feel-
ing of familiarity for repeated items and thus require a higher activation
level before declaring these to be old. In contrast, weak old items elicited a
lower level of memory activation, so that a less stringent criterion/threshold
is adopted.8
In the Type II mirror effect simulation (stimulus class based), a single
decision criterion/threshold is calculated, which collapses new and old items
across low- and high frequency. This is based on the observation that par-
ticipants do not appreciate that low frequency items are more memorable,
but instead adopt a single response criterion/threshold, even if provided
with explicit cues about the item type.8
4. Results
Results for 100 simulation runs of Type I and Type II mirror effects are
given in Table 1 and depicted in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. Distributions are plotted
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for the noisy activation values for the most active detector by item class.
As previously suggested, criteria/thresholds were placed in an unbiased
‘optimal’ way, half-way between the estimated activation means for old and
new items.
4.1. Type I mirror effect
In the Type I mirror effect simulation (strength-based), strong and weak old
items differed only by the number of repetitions during the study/learning
phase. Weak items were presented once, strong items twice, both with a
learning constant ǫ = .05. In line with empirical data, new items, whose














Fig. 3. Type I mirror effect simulations: Frequency (y-axis) distributions for actual max-
imal activation values (x-axis) per item type, based on 100 experimental runs. Response
criteria/thresholds for weak old (dash-dot line) and strong old items (short-dashed line)
are placed mid-way between new and old estimated maximal activation averages.
Distributions of weak and strong old items separate due to more accu-
rate encoding of the latter, resulting in a larger d′ in the strong condition.
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Old items have a larger variance than new items as they were also subject to
variability during learning. The response criterion/threshold in the strong
condition has shifted upward as a function of the higher estimated mean
activation of strong old items. Hits and false alarms follow a mirror effect















Fig. 4. Type II mirror effect simulations: Frequency (y-axis) distributions for actual
maximal activation values (x-axis) per item type, based on 100 experimental runs. A
single response criterion/threshold (short-dashed line) is used for high- and low frequency
items and placed mid-way between collapsed new and old estimated maximal activation
averages.
4.2. Type II mirror effect
In the Type II mirror effect (stimulus class based) simulation, low-frequency
differed from high frequency items in two respects. They had one less ac-
tive unit (49 compared to 50), which was meant to reflect the fact that
low-frequency words tend to have fewer definitions and are thus used in
less varied contexts.11,12 They also had a higher learning rate η than high
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frequency items (0.09 compared to 0.04), simulating better encoding due
to increased attention to their comparative ‘novelty’.2,13 Based on Stretch
and Wixted’s findings,8 a single criterion/threshold was used for high- and
low frequency items. The model reproduces a Type II mirror effect, with
appropriate hits, false alarms and d′ values (see Fig. 4 and Table 1).
5. Conclusions and further work
We have presented a neural network model of memory processes underlying
yes/no decisions in a recognition memory test, which reproduces Type I
and Type II mirror effects. The approach takes inspiration from Bayesian
models of recognition memory, especially from McClelland and Chappell’s
subjective likelihood model.16
One of the most significant differences between the approach presented
here and existing Bayesian models8,12,16,17 is that we obtain a mirror effect
without an explicit likelihood ratio calculation. We have shown here that
the two basic classes of mirror effects can be generated from a simple,
competitive learning neural network in which the values for the familiarity
axis are directly generated from the activation of the winning detectors.
The simplicity of this approach, which is based on a signal detection, single-
process view of recognition memory, along with the direct calculation of the
criterion/threshold from neural activation are the key benefits of the model
we have introduced.
A limitation of our model concerns the treatment of low frequency
words. In order to replicate Type II mirror effects, we had to combine
two assumptions. Firstly, low frequency words elicited increased amounts
of attention compared to high frequency words,2,13 which was reflected by
their higher learning rate. Secondly, low frequency words tend to have fewer
definitions and are associated with fewer contexts, which was reflected by
one less active input unit or ‘feature’ for this stimulus class.11,12 Some
competitor models distinguish low- and high frequency through just one
manipulation.2,11–13
We further assume that neurons can perform a maximum-like operation
(which results in an output signal that approximates the maximum among
several input signals) to calculate response citeria/thresholds. This oper-
ation has been shown to be approximated by complex cells in the visual
cortex of cats and neurons in Area V4 of macaques22 and demonstrated in
a neurophysiologically plausible way for feed-forward models.23
We also assume that humans are able to distinguish high-strength from
low-strength stimuli, yet we do not implement how this might be achieved.
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Whilst this is not ideal, this assumption is common in the literature (e.g.
Ref. 8).
Our model shares some similarities with Bogacz, Brown and Giraud-
Carrier’s familiarity discrimination model.24 This model closely reproduces
observed activation patterns of ‘novelty’ neurons in the perirhinal cortex
with a two-phase three-layer network (binary input, familiarity discrimina-
tion, decision) with primarily feed-forward connections, biologically plau-
sible parameters and Hebbian learning rules. While the authors did not
use sparse coding, they demonstrated by simulation that the network’s be-
haviour would essentially remain unchanged.
During the critical initial period (the familiarity discrimination phase),
the Bogacz et al.24 model’s familiarity discrimination neurons (FDNs) are
likely to become more active for familiar patterns than for novel ones. This
is because Hebbian learning leads the synaptic weights to reflect the cor-
relation between the active inputs for a given FDN. The number of FDNs
that can become active for a given input are limited by fixed high synaptic
weights between specific input and output units in combination with inhi-
bition. Our implementation of a CPCA learning rule in combination with
winner-takes-all achieves similar results, although we do not use homo-
synaptic long-term depression.
In comparison to Bogacz et al.,24 we are less explicit in relating our
model parameters back to functional neuroanatomy and we do not analyse
our model storage capacity mathematically. However, the focus on mod-
elling mirror effects and the use of a signal detection framework distin-
guishes our work.
For further work, we would like to use a principled approach (such as
maximum likelihood estimation) for the setting of free parameters and ex-
tend the model to generate reaction time data. We want to move from
qualitative to quantitative modeling. We aim to generalize the model to
cases in which mirror effects are predicted but not observed and eventually
to a broader range of recognition memory phenomena (e.g. the list length
effect). Eventually, the model could be refined and extended to emulate
known properties of functional neuroanatomy, like, for example, Norman
and O’Reilly’s model.15
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